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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/005,371	12/05/2001	Herman Volkers	570-21 CPA/CON	8836

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EXAMINER

SISSON, BRADLEY L

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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1634

DATE MAILED: 08/15/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

# Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/005,371

Applicant(s)

VOLKERS ET AL.

Examiner

Bradley L. Sisson

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

## Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

## Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 19 July 2005.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

## Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 24-30 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 24-30 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

## Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

## Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☒ None of:
1. ☒ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

## Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 4/15/02 7/19/05
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. \_\_\_\_\_
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

## DETAILED ACTION

### *Withdrawal of Finality*

1. The finality of the Office action mailed 15 April 2005 is hereby withdrawn. Prosecution on the merits is reopened.

### *Specification*

2. The specification contains numerous bibliographic citations, yet it has not been found to contain any statement that the cited documents have been incorporated by reference. As set forth in *Advanced Display Systems Inc. v. Kent State University* (Fed. Cir. 2000) 54 USPQ2d at 1679:

Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material from various documents into a host document--a patent or printed publication in an anticipation determination--by citing such material in a manner that makes it clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein. *See General Elec. Co. v. Brenner*, 407 F.2d 1258, 1261-62, 159 USPQ 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968); *In re Lund*, 376 F.2d 982, 989, 153 USPQ 625, 631 (CCPA 1967). **To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.** *See In re Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 674, 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (providing that incorporation by reference requires a statement "clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found"); *In re Saunders*, 444 F.2d 599, 602-02, 170 USPQ 213, 216-17 (CPA 1971) (reasoning that a rejection or anticipation is appropriate only if one reference "expressly incorporates a particular part" of another reference); *National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.*, 274 F.2d 224, 230, 123 USPQ 279, 283 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1959) (requiring a specific reference to material in an earlier application in order to have that material considered a part of a later application); *cf. Lund*, 376 F.2d at 989, 13 USPQ at 631 (holding that **a one sentence reference to an abandoned application is not sufficient to incorporate from the abandoned application into a new application**). (Emphasis added.)

Attention is also directed to MPEP 608.01(p)I, which, in pertinent part, is reproduced below:

Mere reference to another application, patent, or publication is not an incorporation of anything therein into the application containing such reference for the purpose of the

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disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. In re de Seversky, 474 F.2d 671, 177 USPQ 144 (CCPA 1973). In addition to other requirements for an application, the referencing application should include an identification of the referenced patent, application, or publication. Particular attention should be directed to specific portions of the referenced document where the subject matter being incorporated may be found. (Emphasis added)

Accordingly, the cited documents are not considered to have been incorporated by reference and as such, have not been considered with any effect towards their fulfilling, either in part or in whole, the enablement, written description, or best mode requirements of 35 USC 112, first paragraph.

### *Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112*

3. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

4. As presently worded, the method of claims 24-30 is to result in the distinguishing of any and all manner of target bio-organic molecules, be they DNA, RNA, non-natural nucleic acid sequences, proteins, carbohydrates, steroids, lipids, fatty acids, etc. A review of the disclosure fails to find an adequate written description of just how the infinite number of species encompassed by the now-claimed method is to be practiced. At page 13 of the specification applicant asserts:

The person skilled in the art will clearly be able to choose suitable fluorophores for use in COBRA.

The person skilled in the art will clearly be able to choose suitable ratios of fluorophores in ratio labelling.

It appears that applicant is attempting to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 USC 112, first paragraph, through obviousness. Obviousness, however, cannot be relied upon for

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satisfaction of the written description requirement. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43 USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

Additionally, the specification does not reasonably suggest that applicant had possession of the now-claimed generic method of detecting bio-organic molecules.

5. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 24-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.

6. Claims 24-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter that was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. As set forth in *Enzo Biochem Inc., v. Calgene, Inc.* (CAFC, 1999) 52 USPQ2d at 1135, bridging to 1136:

To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' " *Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Whether claims are sufficiently enabled by a disclosure in a specification is determined as of the date that the patent application was first filed, see *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).... We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a "reasonable" amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must not be "undue." See, e.g., *Wands*, 858 F.2d at 736-37, 8 USPQ2d at 1404 ("Enablement is not precluded by the

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necessity for some experimentation . . . However, experimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation. The key word is 'undue,' not 'experimentation.' ") (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In *In re Wands*, we set forth a number of factors which a court may consider in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation. These factors were set forth as follows: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. *Id.* at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. We have also noted that all of the factors need not be reviewed when determining whether a disclosure is enabling. See *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the *Wands* factors "are illustrative, not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.").

7. It is well settled that one cannot enable that which they do not yet possess. As set forth above, the specification does not reasonably suggest that applicant had possession of the now-claimed method of distinguishing. Accordingly, the specification cannot and does not enable the claimed method whereby one would be able to distinguish any and all manner of bio-organic molecules and wherein said ordinary artisan is attempting to distinguish an infinite number of said bio-organic molecules in a simultaneous manner.

8. While the specification does comprise some examples, said examples are not directed to the general detection of any and all manner of bio-organic molecules under virtually any condition. The situation at hand is analogous to that in *Genentech v. Novo Nordisk A/S* 42 USPQ2d 1001. As set forth in the decision of the Court:

“ ‘[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.’ *In re Wright* 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also *Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharms. Co.*, 927 F. 2d 1200, 1212, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1026 (Fed Cir. 1991); *In re Fisher*, 427 F. 2d 833, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970) (‘[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.’).

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“Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable. *See Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148 USPQ 689, 696 (1966) (starting, in context of the utility requirement, that ‘a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’) Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure. While every aspect of a generic claim certainly need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified in the specification, reasonable detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the invention.

“It is true . . . that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art. *See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skill in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point, a direction for further research. (Emphasis added)

Clearly, the instant application does not enable the full scope of that now being claimed. In view of the foregoing remarks, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 24-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

Response to argument

9. At page 16, bridging to page 18 of the response received 19 July 2005, hereinafter the response, applicant’s representative traverses the rejection of claims 24-30 as failing to comply with the written description requirement.

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10. Agreement is reached at page 17 of the response in that an applicant need not provide a detailed description of each and every embodiment/species encompassed by the claims.

However, the amount of description provided must be sufficient so as to reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the invention.

11. As applicant's representative has noted, the specification teaches at page 11 that "COBRA labelling can be used for the labeling and/or detection of bio-organic molecules such as nucleic acid, protein, lipid and/or carbohydrate."

As presently worded the claimed method fairly encompasses the use of an infinite number of probes that are distinctly labeled with primary labels wherein the probes "recognizes a target bio-organic molecule." Applicant's representative asserts at page 17 of the response that "two species are specifically exemplified." Said representative does not teach what those species are or where the exemplification is to be found. A review of the specification finds where some labels have been applied to nucleic acids and two proteins (Example 15; BSA and avidin; page 45 of disclosure). Clearly, the specification does not provide any teaching of lipids and carbohydrates, much less other bio-organic entities, e.g., steroids. And while the specification does provide examples of labeling nucleic acids and proteins, there is no showing where any form of RNA was labeled. Further, the immensely diverse genus of proteins is not adequately represented by a showing where but two proteins (BSA and avidin) are labeled. While an applicant is not required to teach any and all embodiments encompassed by the claims, the disclosure must be sufficiently robust so as to reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of that which is claimed. When as here the claims fairly encompass hundreds of millions of species of DNA, RNA, proteins, carbohydrates, steroids of any life form, known and

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unknown, a showing of more than two species is warranted. In support of this position attention is directed to the decision in *In re Shokal*, 113 USPQ 283 (CCPA 1957) wherein is stated:

It appears to be well settled that a single species can rarely, if ever, afford sufficient support for a generic claim. *In re Soll*, 25 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1309, 97 F.2d 623, 38 USPQ 189; *In re Wahlforss et al.*, 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 867, 117 F.2d 270, 48 USPQ 397. The decisions do not however fix any definite number of species which will establish completion of a generic invention and it seems evident therefrom that such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of particular cases. Thus, in the case of small genus such as the halogens, consisting of four species, a reduction to practice of three, or perhaps even two, might serve to complete the generic invention, while in the case of a genus comprising hundreds of species, a considerably larger number of reductions to practice would probably be necessary.

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We are of the opinion that a genus containing such a large number of species cannot properly be identified by the mere recitation or reduction to practice of four or five of them. As was pointed out by the examiner, four species might be held to support a genus, if such genus is disclosed in clear language; but where those species must be relied on not only to illustrate the genus but to define what it is, the situation is otherwise.

12. At page 18 of the response applicant's representative, citing *Hybritech*, states: "The description need only describe in detail that which is new or not conventional."

The above argument has been fully considered and has not been found persuasive. It is noted with particularity that the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit in deciding the case did not consider the aspect of the sufficiency of written description but rather, evaluated whether the claims were enabled. While enablement, written description and best mode all fall under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, they are distinct requirements. While certain embodiments of a claim may well be well known and even quite obvious, obviousness cannot be relied upon for satisfaction of the written description requirement. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43

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USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

13. Also at page 18 (and again at page 19) applicant's representative provides conclusory statements as to what one of skill could predict.

14. This argument has been fully considered and has not been found persuasive. Attention is directed to MPEP 2145.

Attorney argument is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art.

The arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In *re Schulze*, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In *re Geisler*, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness."). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of attorney statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration.

15. Therefore, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejection is maintained.

### ***Conclusion***

16. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

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17. A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.


18. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571) 272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

19. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, W. Gary Jones can be reached on (571) 272-0745. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-272-8300.

20. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR

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system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "B. L. Sisson".

Bradley L. Sisson  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1634

BLS  
10 August 2005